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PROVINCIAL SUSPENSION OF LICENCES 
Vs. 




The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship 
between a suspension of a driver’s licence* and a prohibition from 
driving; in view of the amendments to the Criminal Code con­
tained in the 1972 Criminal Law Amendment Act,2 and of the 
recent reference of the Bell and Ross cases to the Supreme Court 
of Canada from decisions3 in their respective provinces.
It is intended to examine the various constitutional aspects 
of this matter, and then to consider the various provincial statutes, 
with comment on the manner in which the licence suspension is 
carried out. On the constitutional question the examination will 
centre around (1) the legitimacy of the respective federal and 
provincial statutes in this area — whether or not the constitution 
permits such legislation; (2) the doctrine of paramountcy — 
whether the “field has been occupied”; and (3) what the results 
are, since the legislation of both the federal and provincial govern­
ments is valid and not declared ultra vires of their respective 
legislatures. The other areas to be examined are (a) the provincial 
statutes currently in force, (b) the issue as to whether or not 
licence suspension should remain automatic, and (c) that the 
present automatic suspensions may be a denial of natural jus­
tice.
The problem arises in a typical situation illustrated by the 
following example.4
t  The author is a third year Law student at the University of New Brunswick; 
this article is based on a paper com pleted for a seminar on Constitutional 
Law taken during the past academ ic year.
1 Licence suspension here (and in all other cases throughout this work) is in­
tended to include suspension, revocation, or cancellation of a license or a 
permit to drive or the right to secure such licence or permit to drive.
2 S.C. 1972. c. 13. s. 18.
3 Bell v. A.G. o f P.E.I. (1973), 4 Nfld. & P.E.I. R.27; and Ross v. Ont. Registrar 
o f M otor Vehicles (unreported).
4 Reference here is to the New Brunswick practice, especially to situations 
where conflict seem s to arise most frequently: impaired driving and breatha­
lyzer cases.
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1. John Doe is stopped by police officers after they have 
seen him weaving down the street in his car. There is no 
question that he is impaired; strong odour of intoxicating 
liquor, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, fumbling for driv­
er’s license, stumbling gait while walking, etc.
2. A demand is made for John Doe to give a breath sample 
pursuant to s.235 of the Criminal Code.5 If he refuses 
there are reasonable and probable grounds upon which 
a conviction can be sustained for such refusal pursuant 
to s.235(2) of the Criminal Code. In any event, the result 
in court is the same whether the conviction is based on 
impaired driving,6 breathalyzer reading in excess of 80 
milligrams of alcohol,7 or a refusal where the demand has 
been made because of reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe the accused was impaired.8
3. In New Brunswick, for any of these three offences, a 
a provincial court judge will normally impose a fine of 
$200.00 and a prohibition from driving for four months.9
4. Either at the request of John Doe or upon his own initia­
tive the judge may vary the driving prohibition if he is 
satisfied that Doe needs to use his car during the course 
of, or to get to and from, his employment.10
5. The judge may note in his instructions to John Doe that 
he is prohibited from driving, for example, between the 
hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., each night, and that 
he can only use his car or other motor vehicle between 
the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. to get to work or while 
working. This latter part of his comment is the area that 
causes the surprise to John Doe later on.
5 Criminal Code R.S.C. 1970, C.34.
6 Ibid. S.234.
7 Ibid. S .236.
8 Ibid. S.235(2).
9 Per Criminal Code S.238, as amended by S.C. 1972 C.13, s.18.
10 Supra, note 9.
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6. John Doe is ordered to turn in his driver’s licence to the 
court pursuant to s.279 of the Motor Vehicle Act."
7. The Court sends the surrendered licence with notations 
as to the penalties to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 
who is required to inform John Doe that his licence has 
been revoked for four months.12
In effect he is not allowed to drive at all whether it is in con­
nection with his work or not, regardless of the fact that the pro­
hibition of driving under the Criminal Code was for only half of 
each day and gave the impression that the rest of the time was 
unaffected by any penalties. His next step in New Brunswick is 
to make application to the Licence Suspension Appeal Board 
which may vary the licence suspension if satisfied that Doe re­
quires the licence in the course of his work,13 or that suspension 
will result in exceptional hardship, and that it is not contrary to 
the public interest to allow him to get the licence back.14
A more difficult problem arises for people from provinces 
which do not allow a review of the suspension, and those New 
Brunswickers who fail to meet the standards of the Board. They 
do not understand how the provincial legislation can seem to 
have a stronger effect than the Criminal Code. Partly it is the 
fault of the judges who frame their judgments in the manner that 
they do for ease of explanation; partly it is the fault of the prac­
titioners who do not explain the differences between the provi­
sions of the Criminal Code and the Motor Vehicle Act.15 The 
greatest blame, however, lies with the various legislatures which 
have allowed this confusion to persist.
11 M otor Vehicle Act, S.N.B. 1955. C.13, S.279 as am ended by S.N.B. 1957 
C.21. S.30.
12 M.V.A. S269(l)(b) and S.271(l)(b) as amended to 1972.
13 M. V.A. S.281B(6) as enacted by 1973 S.N.B. C.59 s.18.
14 M.V.A. S.281 B(4) as enacted by 1967 S.N.B. C.54 s.25.
15 It is evident that som e practitioners do not understand the subtleties them­
selves. when they direct enquiries to provincial authorities concerning appli­
cations for remission of Criminal Code prohibitions rather than to the National 
Parole Board in the same manner as applications for remission of prison 
sentences.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
At this point it is well to review the various principles found 
in the cases and the legislation out of which the problem arises. 
The problem can be phrased in the questions:
Which legislature has authority to grant drivers’ licences 
to permit people to drive?
Which can take away a driver’s licence?
Which has authority to prohibit a person from driving?
The provinces answer by saying that these are matters dealing 
with local licencing, local highways, or civil rights within the 
provinces. The federal response is to regulate the matter by using 
the Criminal Law power.
The British North America Act16 states in the opening para­
graph to s. 91:
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, and House o f Commons, to make laws for the peace, order 
and good government o f Canada in relation to all matters not com ing  
within the classes of the subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to 
the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater certainty, but not so  
as to restrict the generality o f the foregoing terms of this section, it is 
hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclu­
sive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all 
matters coming within the classes of subjects next herein-after enum er­
ated; that is to say, — . . .
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal 
Jurisdiction, but including the procedure in Criminal Matters.
and in the closing portion of s. 91:
Any matter coming within any of the classes o f subjects enumerated  
in this section shall not be deem ed to com e within the class o f matters 
of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes 
of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the 
province.
The introductory test to s.92 of the B.N.A. Act17 is as follows:
In each province, the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation 
to matters coming within the classes o f subjects next hereinafter enumer­
ated, that is to say. — . . :
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
16. Generally all matters o f a merely local or private Nature in the 
Province.
16 B.N.A. Act. 1867, 30 & 31 Viet. C. 3.
17 Ibid.
U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL 63
A. THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION
Given the above statutory enactments, it is obvious that any 
provincial legislation has to be within the powers18 given to the 
provinces by s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act. A 1941 interpretation of 
these principles permitted the Supreme Court of Canada to de­
cide, in the Egan19 case, substantially the same questions as those 
which were appealed to that Court in May, 1973. The only major 
legislative change, since 1941, is that now the Criminal Code allows 
for the prohibition from driving to be intermittent rather than 
for a full period of time.
The majority of the court in the Egan case prefaced their 
“obiter’ 0 remarks on the constitutionality of the impugned pro­
vincial statute with the comment that the two enactments were 
not co-extensive and that the constitutionality of s. 285(7) of the 
Code was not in question.21 The provincial statute, Rinfret, J., 
said is for the regulation of traffic and “deals purely and simply 
with certain civil rights in the Province of P.E.I.”22 and the author­
ity to issue such licences, or permits, carries with it the authority 
to suspend or cancel them upon the happening of certain con­
ditions.23 Taschereau, J. referred to the provincial legislation as 
merely providing “for civil disability arising out of a conviction 
for a criminal offence.”24 It aims “at the suppression of a nuisance 
on highways.”25 Sir Lyman Duff, C.J.C., also recognized that the 
provincial legislation was intra vires of the provinces for the pur­
pose of highway traffic regulation and licencing of drivers.26
In the years prior to the Egan decision the courts had often 
been called upon to delineate the power given to the provinces 
by the B.N.A. Act. The extent of the power of the Legislatures 
was thought by Sir Barnes Peacock in Hodge v. The Queen27 
to be the full “plenitude of its power” as the Imperial Parliament 
could bestow. “Within these limits of subjects” (as enumerated 
by s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act) “and area the local legislature is 
supreme . . .  .28
18 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881-2). 7 App. Cas., 96 (P.C.) (Ont.); 
and Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829.
19 Prov. Secretary o f  P.E.I. v. Egan. [1941] S.C.R. 398.
20 Ibid. at 412, per Rinfret, J.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. at 414.
23 Ibid. at 416.
24 Supra, note 19 at 418.
25 Ibid.
26 Supra note 19 at 402.
27 (1883-4), 9 App. Cas. 115 (P.C.) (Ont.).
28 Ibid. at 132.
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In order to determine the validity of a provincial (or federal) 
statute it is necessary to look at its “true nature and character”29 
or its “pith and substance”.30 The search is for the effect of the 
legislation rather than for its purported intent. Such directions 
are well-meaning, but their nebulous phraseology leaves consider­
able room for interpretation.
If the substance of the provincial legislation is within the 
enumerations of s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act it does not matter that 
a person might be left open to double liability.31 This was recog­
nized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bedard v. Dawson32 
where the court cut a fine line between provincial powers and 
the federal criminal law in allowing a conviction under the 
federal code to be used as a basis for taking action under a 
provincial statute. Mr. Justice Idington went so far as to suggest 
that:
Provincial legislatures have such absolute power over property and 
civil rights that unless they encroach on the powers assigned to the 
Dominion, it would be impossible to question their legislation except 
by veto of Parliament.33
The particular legislation, aimed at disorderly houses, was upheld 
primarily on the basis that its purpose was the suppression of a 
nuisance, or the prevention of crime rather than punishment of 
it. Mr. Justice Brodeur commented:
Nos lois provinciales fourmillent d’exem ples et des cas ou les lois crim- 
inelles sont invoguees pour determiner les droits et les obligations 
civiles des citoyens.34
Idington J’s caveat35 concerning provincial encroachment 
on the federal power had already been made by the Privy Council 
in the Madden36 case. It was to the effect that provincial govern­
29 Russell v. The Queen (1882-3). 7 App. Cas. 829 (P.C.) (N.B.) at 839; A.-G. for  
Ont. v. Reciprocal Insurers, [19241 A.C. 328 (P.C.)(Ont.) and Lieberman 
v. /?., [1963) S.C.R. 643 (N.B.).
30 Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden. [1889] A.C. 589 (P.C.)(B.C.) at 587; Ladore 
v. Bennett. [1939] A.C. 468 (P.C.) (Ont.) and Esquimault & Nanaimo Ry. v. A.-G. 
of British Columbia. [1950] A.C. 87 (P.C.MB.C.).
31 R. v. Stone. (1893). 23 O.R. 46 (Ont. C.P.D.) at 49.
32 11923] S.C.R. 681 (Que.).
33 Ibid. at 683.
34 Supra note 32 at 686, per Brodeur J.:
“Our provincial statutes furnish examples and cases where the criminal laws 
are invoked to determine the civil rights and obligations of the citizens” — 
(Rough translation).
35 Supra, note 33.
36 Madden v. Nelson & Dox Sheppard Ry, [1899] A.C. 626, (P.C.MB.C.).
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ments cannot use the all-embracing head s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act — 
property and civil rights — for what might otherwise be an ultra 
vires purpose. However, it is clear that valid provincial laws may 
be enforced against companies and similar institutions created 
by the use of federal statutes, since they are required to conform 
to the local, provincial laws — provided such laws apply to all with­
out discrimination.37
Where the provinces use the Criminal Code to limit privileges 
that they grant, one could conclude that such use of the Code to 
determine the civil rights of their citizens is an abdication or dele­
gation of their authority to the federal government. If this were 
the situation, it would contravene the Supreme Court’s direction 
that neither a provincial legislature nor the Federal Parliament 
can effect such a delegation of power in those areas where it has 
been endowed with the exclusive power to legislate, since both 
levels of government are sovereign within their own spheres.38 
The response of the provinces to this submission may be seen by 
analogy with comments of Rand J., in the 1959 Lord’s Day Alliance 
39 — the provinces had only decided when their legislation will 
be effective: when a person has committed an offence under the 
Criminal Code.
In other situations, it is competent for the provinces to regu­
late securities dealers by imposing additional constraints on a 
dealer previously convicted of a Criminal Code offence;40 they 
can, by statute, absolve an insurer from liability for idemnifica- 
tion of an insured who causes a car accident due to intoxication;41 
and they may legislate to seize and impound a car under a pro­
vincial Highway Traffic Act because of an offence committed 
under the Criminal Code, it being legislation “dealing simply with 
the civil consequences of conviction of a criminal offence”.42
37 Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Corp. o f Notre Dame de Barsecours, [1899] A.C. 
367 (P.C.MQue.); Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575, (P.C.) 
(Que.).
38 A.-G. ofN .S. v. A.-G. o f Canada, [1951] S.C.R. 31.
39 Lord's Day Alliance v. A.-G. o f B.C., [1959] S.C.R. 497.
40 Lymbum  v. Mayland. [1932] A.C. 318 (P.C .)(Alta.).
41 Home Insurance Co. v. Linda! & Beattie, [1934 S.C.R. 33 (Alta.).
42 McDonald v. Down, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 177 (Ont. H.C.) at 181; a ffd  [1941] 1 D.L.R 
799 (Ont. C.A.).
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Also, it does not matter that there has been a conviction under the 
Criminal Code. A plea of autrefois convict or acquit is not avail­
able to an accused for a charge under a provincial statute when 
the essential ingredients to a conviction for both “offences” are 
not the same.43 In the Ottenson case,44 although a provincial 
statute was rendered inoperative by the Criminal Code offence 
of driving under the influence of liquor, nevertheless, it was said: 
It can at once be pointed out that no objection can be taken to the use 
of provincial sanctions for the purpose o f suspending or cancelling the 
licence of a person convicted of a breach of s. 42 [of M an. H .T .A .j.
In this respect the legislation is clearly within the com petence of the 
province and cannot be affected by the code.*3
It is submitted that the provinces by the constitution have 
at least a prima facie right to legislate for safety on the highways 
and the licencing of drivers. The question of whether the federal 
government can take over and occupy the field to the exclusion 
of the provinces will be discussed after an examination is made of 
how the Parliament can legislate in this area.
B. THE FEDERA L LEGISLA TION
The problem discussed in this paper derives from the 1972 
amendments to ss. 238 of the Criminal Code, which, one may 
speculate were, in turn, made because of conflicting decisions 
of the Alberta Court of Appeal.46 The latter court had allowed a 
prohibition under s. 255(1 )(b) of the pre-1972 Criminal Code to 
be intermittent, whereas the former had rules against the principle 
of intermittent sentencing since the Code contained a provision 
that the prohibition was to be effective “during any period” up 
to three years.
The pertinent portion of s. 238(1) of the present Criminal
Code48 is as follows:
Where an accused is convicted of an offence under section 203,
204. or 219 com mitted by means o f a motor vehicle or of an offence  
under section 233, 234, 235. 236 or subsection (3) o f this section , the 
court, judge, justice or magistrate, as the case may be, may, in addition 
to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence make 
an order prohibiting him from driving a motor vehicle in Canada at all 
times or at such times and places as may be specified in that order . . . .
43 R. v. Nadan (No. 1)( 1924-25), 21 Alta, L.R. 193 (Alta C.A.).
44 R. v. Ottenson (1931), 40 Man. R. 95 (Man. C.A.).
45 Ibid. at 97.
46 R. v. Adamoweiz (1967), 56 W.W.R. 572 (Alta. C.A.). See also R. v. Lloyd.,
[1969]IC .C .C . 109 (N.B.C.A.), and R. v. Hebert (1970), 1 O.R. 782 (Ont. C.A.).
47 R. v. Kazakoff (1962), 52 W.W.R. 427 (B.C.C.A.).
48 Supra, note 5, S.238 as am. by Criminal Law Amendment A c t  S.C. 1972, 
C. 13 s. 18.
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S. 238(3) authorizes the imposition of penalties to a person who 
drives while prohibited under subsection (1) or while his licence 
or right to secure a licence has been legally suspended or can­
celled. And,
Subsection (3) does not apply to a person who drives a motor vehicle 
in Canada while he is disqualified or prohibited from driving a motor 
vehicle by reason of the legal suspension or cancellation, in any province 
of his permit or licence or of his right to secure a permit or licence to 
drive a motor vehicle in the province, where that suspension or can­
cellation is inconsistent with an order made with respect to him under 
subsection ( l ) 49
In the Egan case Sir Lyman Duff, C.J. was the only member 
of the court who expressed the opinion that the Criminal Code 
section similar to the above was intra vires.50 The majority of the 
court said that the constitutionality of then s. 285(7) of the code 
was not in question.51
However, in interpreting the federal criminal law power, 
other courts have allowed the federal government wide scope in 
that “it is the criminal law in its widest sense that is reserved” 
to Parliament.52 Nor is Parliament restricted to areas recognized 
as criminal at Confederation; the criminal law can be increased 
or decreased in its effect by this standard: “Is the act prohibited 
with penal consequences?53 This may partially determine the 
legitimacy of a federal statute, but it does not limit penal con­
sequences only to federal statutes.54
Although the federal criminal law power is wide in scope 
it is not unrestricted. Sir Montague Smith in the Citizens In­
surance*5 case was of the opinion that, as a matter of general 
principle, to allow the exclusive powers assigned to the provinces 
to be absorbed into those given to the federal government would
49 Ibid.
50 Supra, note 19 at 400.
51 Supra, note 21.
52 A.-G. for Ont. v. Hamilton Street Ry., [1903] A.C. 524 (P.C.).
53 Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. A.-G. for Canada.[ 1931 ] A.C. 310 
(P.C.XCan.) at 324.
54 S ee  infra  n o te  128, and S. 92(15) o f the B .N .A . A ct w hich  g iv es  to  the  
p ro v in ces  au th ority  to  im p ose  pun ish m ent to  en fo r c e  the ir  law s w hich  
have b een  va lid ly  m ade; and A .-G . fo r  B.C. v . A .-G . fo r  Canada, [1937] 
A .C . 368 (P.C .M C an.) at 376.
55 C itizen s' Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881-2), 7 A pp. C as 96 (P .C .)(O n t.)  
at 108.
68 U.N.B. LA W JOURNAL
not be in keeping with the intent of the B.N.A. Act. Some re­
striction on the federal government is necessary to give efficacy 
to the provincial power, otherwise Parliament could declare 
an act criminal or as involving trade and commerce or peace, 
order and good government, thereby overruling the provincial 
authority in the matter. Bearing this kind of statement in mind 
the Privy Council, in the Local Prohibitions case, was of the 
opinion that Parliament could not “trench” on any of the powers 
given to the provinces by s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act by using its 
general power to legislate for peace, order and good govern­
ment.56 The admonition of the Privy Council in the Madden 
case, that a government cannot pass legislation to do indirectly 
that which it is prohibited from doing directly,57 has been extend­
ed to the federal criminal law power in the sense that the crimin­
al law cannot be used as a guise to encroach on the enumerated 
provincial powers.58 In Ladore v. Bennett, it is said that:
the Courts will be careful to detect and invalidate any actual violation  
of constitutional restrictions under the pretence of keeping within the 
statutory field.59
Insofar as the federal government’s general power of peace, 
order and good government is concerned, it is now clear that 
this can only be used if the real subject matter of the legislation 
“goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests that have 
grown to national importance”,61 or that may be taken over by 
the federal government in a national emergency situation,62 is 
tempered by the comment of Viscount Simon, that “it is the nature 
of the legislation itself and not the existence of emergency that 
must determine whether it is valid or not.”63 Some thirty years 
earlier Viscount Haldane was of the opinion that the trenching 
principle could only be used by Parliament with respect to those 
matters that are specifically listed in s. 91 of the Act, and not in
56 A.-G. for Ontario v. A.-G. for the Dominion, [1896) A.C. 348 (P.C.)(Ont.) at 
108.
57 Supra, note 37 at 627-8.
58 A.-G. for B C. v. A.-G. for Canada, [ 1937] A.C. 368 (P.C.MCan.) at 375.
59 Ladore v. Bennett, [1939] A.C. 468 (P.C.)(Ont.) at 482.
61 As first proposed in Local Prohibitions Case, supra, note 55 at 361.
62 Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. Ltd., [1923]
A.C. 695 (P.C.)(M an.).
63 Supra, note 60 at 206.
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respect to the federal general legislative power.64 In the Dairy 
Industry case Rand J. reinforced this comment, and the remark 
in the Montreal Street Railway65 case with respect to the federal 
trade and commerce power, by the proposition that it is not by 
the aggregate of local interests that an industry attains national 
importance so as to be the subject of federal intervention.66
Although one could argue that drunken driving, criminal 
negligence on the nation’s highways, and similar acts involving 
the use of motor vehicles, have increased to such an extent that 
they constitute national problems of emergency proportions it 
would seem that the only way that Parliament can constitutionally 
legislate to attack this situation is by using its criminal law power. 
Criminal law is used here in the sense of connoting act or omissions 
to the extent that they are prohibited by the state and that those 
who go beyond the bounds permitted are punished.67 It is con­
ceded that it is still within the power of the federal government 
to apply “the criminal law generally to acts and omissions which 
so far are only covered by provincial enactments,”68 although 
such action must not be exerted in an area “in which apart from 
such a procedure, it could exert no legal authority.”69 From this 
one can conclude that Parliament cannot cloak its legislation 
in “criminal robes” and thereby expect to escape judicial scrutiny. 
In using s. 238 of the Criminal Code to provide for punishment 
of infractions of certain of the Code’s provisions, it would appear 
that the federal government has chosen the correct course of 
action. The next item to be considered is whether there is any 
conflict between the federal and provincial legislation.
C. THE PARAMOUNTCY ISSUE
This section will examine the principles of paramountcy and 
the reluctance of the courts to declare legislation ultra vires 
through the use of principles embodied in the aspect theory and 
the complementary theory.
64 A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Alberta, [1916] A.C. 588 (P.C.)(Can.).
65 Montreal v. Montreal St. Railway, [1912] A.C. 333 (P.C.HQue.).
66 Reference as to the Validity o f Section 5A o f the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] 
S.C.R. 1 (Can.).
67 Supra, note 53 at 324.
68 Supra, note 58 at 376.
69 A.-G. for Ontario*. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328 (I\C .)(O nt.) at 342.
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The principle of paramountcy of federal legislation has been 
accepted by the Privy Council as being derived from both the 
opening paragraph of s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act70 as well as the con­
clusion to s. 9171 so long as the federal legislation falls strictly 
within its enumerated powers. An early test for the issue of para­
mountcy was formulated by Lord Dunedin in the Grand Trunk 
Railway72 case as he paraphrased two earlier cases:73
First there can be a domain in which provincial and Dominion legis­
lation may overlap, in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires, 
if the field is clear; and, secondly, that if the field is not clear, and in 
such a domain the two legislations m eet, the Dom inion legislation must 
prevail.74
This “meeting” of the respective pieces of legislation is used in 
the sense of a collision between the two.
In the Egan case Duff C.J. considered the following test in 
examining the impugned statutes:
. . .  the precise question must be whether or not the matter of the pro­
vincial legislation that is challenged is so related to the substance of the 
Dominion criminal legislation as to be brought within the scope of 
criminal law in the sense of Section 9175, (of the B.N.A. Act].
The High Court of Australia in the Clyde Engineering case76 
formulated the following tests:
If a com petent legislature expressly or inpliedly evinces its intention 
to cover the whole field, that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where 
another legislature assumes to enter to any extent upon the same field.77
and
If one enactment makes or acts upon as lawful that which the other 
makes unlawful, or if one enactment makes unlawful that which the 
other makes or acts upon as lawful, the two are to that extent incon­
sistent.78
70 Tenant v. Union Bank o f Canada, [1894] A.C. 31 (P.C.MOnt.) at 45.
71 Supra, note 56 at 359.
72 Grand Trunk Ry. v. A.-G. for Canada, [1907] A.C. 65 (P.C.HCan.).
73 A.-G. for Ontario y. A.-G. for Canada, [1894] A .C .189 (P.C.HOnt.) and Tenant 
v. Union Bank o f Canada, [1894] A.C. 31 (P.C.)(Ont.).
74 Supra, note 72 at 68.
75 Supra, note 19 at 402.
76 Clyde Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Cowburn (1925-26), 37 C.L.R. 466.
77 Supra, note 76 at 489.
78 Supra, note 76 at 490.
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Prof. Laskin, as he then was, has indicated that the first of these 
tests has not been accepted in interpretation of the Canadian 
constitution.79 The second test appears to be valid in Canada so 
long as both legislatures have enacted laws. To declare other­
wise would be cause for overruling a large number of decisions 
which have allowed the Provinces to remain in fields in which 
Parliament has chosen not to legislate or to cover only partially.
Certainly a federal or provincial statute will not be invalid 
because it incidentally affects a matter falling within the other’s 
jurisdiction if the legislation is otherwise valid: e.g. (1) provincial 
legislation affecting the amount of interest charges by a lender;80 
and (2) incidental federal interference with property rights81 or 
provincial revenues.82 The court in the Russell case indicated that:
it could not have been intended, when assuring to the provinces exclu­
sive legislative authority on the subject o f property and civil rights, to ex­
clude the Parliament from the exercise of this general power whenever 
such incidental interference would result from it.83
Also related to the ancillary question is the double aspect 
theory, to which the Belisle case84 had earlier pointed the way, 
formulated by Sir Barnes Peacock in the Hodge case:
The Russell and Citizens Insurance Co. cases illustrate that subjects 
which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within sect. 92 may in an­
other purpose fall within sect. 91.85
Such a formula made easier the natural tendency to uphold federal 
or provincial legislation as valid.86 Although the Criminal Code87 
and the Shaw case in Manitoba indicate that it is not valid to 
“render an offender liable to be punished twice for the same of­
fence,”88 this has not prevented the courts from neatly defining 
the provincial punishments “civil” in nature, rather than “criminal”. 
Accordingly, “civil” punishments can be substituted with virtually 
the same consequences as they would be in the criminal law.89 It
79 Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 3rd Ed. (Carswell, Toronto) at 108.
80 A.-G. for Ontario v. Barfield Enterprises, [19631 S.C.R. 570 (Ont.).
81 Cushing v. Dupuy (1879-80) 5 App. Cas. 409 (P.C.MQue.).
82 Russell v. The Queen (1881-2) 7 App. Cas. 829 (P.C.MN.B.) at 838.
83 Supra, note 82 at 839.
84 L'Union St. Jacques de Montreal v. Belisle (1874-5), L.R. 6 P.C. 31 (Que.).
85 Supra, note 27 at 130.'
86 R. v. Wason (1889-90), 17 O.A.R. 221 (C.A.) at 236.
87 Supra, note 4 S .5(l).
88 E. v. Shaw (1890-91), 7 Man. R. 518 (C.A.) at 528.
89 Toronto Ry. Co. v. City o f  Toronto, [19201 A.C. 446 (P.C.)(Ont.).
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has long been accepted that in spite of the fact that Parliament 
can legislate as to the criminal law, it “cannot interfere with or ex­
clude the powers of the Province of dealing with the same thing in 
its civil aspect.”90 This attribute of the aspect doctrine in our fed­
eral system of government gives rise to de facto if not de jure 
double jeopardy. This is precisely the situation that is the subject 
of this article — that both the federal government and the pro­
vinces can effectively revoke a driving privilege on the happening 
of a single event. The provinces here legislate for safety on the 
highways, while the federal government legislates criminal punish­
ments. Each aspect, purpose or point of view is proper to the re­
spective legislature and Parliament.91
In practical terms these theories are of little comfort to the 
person who may be convicted twice for committing a single act 
or omission. It is disconcerting to note that but for the fact that the 
administration of justice is the responsibility of the provinces92 it is 
possible to be charged and convicted of two offences arising out 
of the same incident, because “each law was passed by its enacting 
authority for its own purpose within its own field.”93
Statutory interpretation using the double aspect approach, 
plus the general tendency to “compartmentalize”94 topics of a con­
stitutional nature with resulting inflexibility in this area of judicial 
interpretation have given rise to the ascendency of the comple­
mentary theory. This holds that the provincial legislation not re­
pugnant to federal legislation “in the sense that compliance with 
one law involves breach of the other”95 is intra vires. Accordingly, 
provincial legislation, imposing penalties for a lesser “degree” of 
men's rea than is caught by the Criminal Code, has been accepted 
by the Supreme Court of Canada for careless driving,96 failure to
90 Supra, note 31 at 49 accepting argument of counsel in R. v. Wason (1889-90),
17 O .A.R. 221.
91 Supra, note 19 at 400 and 401 per Duff, C.J. in accepting a passage from A.-G. 
Canada v. A.-G. for Alta., (1916) 1 A.C. 588 at 5%.
92 This fact does not preclude the possibility of two charges; it renders it un­
likely.
93 R. v. Kissick (1942), 50 Man. R. 194 (Man. C.A.) per Robson J.A. at 203.
94 Carr, "Division of Legislative Powers under the British North America Act — 
The Case for Fully Concurrent Powers" (1970-71), 4 Man. L.J. 297.
95 Smith v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 776 (Ont.) per Martland J. at 800.
96 O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804, whereas the court was of the opinion  
that "inadvertent” negligence was a difference in kind and not in degree than 
advertent negligence; and Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238.
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stop at the scene of an accident97 and issuance of false information 
to deceive purchasers of securities.98
This occurred despite the statement by Lord Watson in the 
Union Colliery case that:
The abstinence of the Dom inion Parliament from legislating to the full 
limit o f its powers, could not have the effect o f transferring to the pro­
vincial legislature the legislative power which had been assigned to the 
Dominion by S. 91 o f the Act of 1867.99
On this basis it could be argued that a prohibition from driv­
ing on an intermittent basis removed from the provinces any power 
on their part to legislate for the period of time that was not covered 
by the prohibition since the intermittent prohibition, though not 
in explicit terms permitting one to drive in those time periods for 
which there is no prohibition, at least gives an implicit permission 
to do so.100
However, at first glance, Lord Watson’s statement overlooks 
the fact that the provinces do not have to be transferred the power 
to legislate over highway safely and the like; they only lose that 
power by virtue of the federal occupation of the field.101 In addi­
tion, an examination of the Saskatchewan Breath Specimen case 
gives credence to the view that a prohibition by the federal crim­
inal law for one aspect does not mean that the Provinces are re­
stricted in the action they may take. Accordingly, a prohibition 
against compulsory breath samples was restricted to the Criminal 
Code provisions and did not apply to a provincial statute for high­
way control.102 In the O'Grady v. Sparling case the majority of the 
court refrained from accepting Cartwright J.’s remarks to the effect 
that a prohibition implies permission to do that which is not pro­
hibited.103 It would appear then that the provinces are restricted 
only when the federal government actually occupies the field;
97 Stephen v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 823, whereas tne Criminal Code referred 
to intent to escape civil or criminal liability.
98 Smith v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 776, whereas the Criminal Code in this 
case imposed penalties for issuing a false prospectus.
99 Union Colliery Co. y.Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580 (P.C.lB.C.) at 588.
100 See R. v. Thorbum  (1917-18), 41 O.L.R. 39 (Ont. H.C.).
101 See note 56 at 369.
102 Re Validity o f Section 92(4) o f the Vehicles A ct 1957 (Sask.), [1958] S.C.R. 
608.
103 Supra, note % at 821.
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for example, provincial laws declared inoperative with respect to 
driving while one’s licence is suspended,104 or the keeping of slot 
machines in the face of federal legislation on the same subject.105 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal carried the paramountcy 
principle to the extent of declaring that the Federal Indian Act, 
prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians, takes precedence over 
the provincial Liquor Act which prohibited liquor sales to anyone, 
Indian or white.106
While more recent courts would tend to distinguish the last- 
mentioned Cooper case so as to give effect to the provincial legis­
lation, the courts of Ontario, with the introduction of the inter­
mittent driving feature for prohibitions in the Criminal Code, have 
taken a stand against the automatic suspension feature of the pro­
vincial statutes. In the Caravaggio case107 Haines J. imposed a sen­
tence which included an intermittent prohibition from driving 
and added the directive that “the operator’s licence of the accused 
shall not be suspended under provisions of s. 21 of the Highway 
Traffic Act.”108 Since s. 21109 makes a statutory declaration that 
the licence is suspended as from the conviction, the validity of 
such a directive is doubtful.110
Most recently in the Lamoureux case111 the Ontario High 
Court was of the opinion that
by enacting the amended section which provides for no suspension, 
intermittent suspension or full-time suspension as the convicting officer  
deems appropriate. Parliament has not occupied the field even more 
fully than it had when the Egan case, supra, fell to be decid ed .1*2
104 R. v. Dickie. [1955] 2 D.L.R. 757 (Alta. S.C.), and R. v. Munro (1959), 2 D.L.R. 
(2d) 443 (Man. C.A.).
105 Johnson v. A.-G. o f Alberta. (1954] S.C.R. 127 (Alta.).
106 R. v. Cooper (1921-25), 35 B.C.R. 457 (B.C.C.A.).
107 R  v. Caravaggio (1972), 19 C.R.N.S. 390 (Ont. S.C.).
108 Supra, note 107 at 392-3.
109 Ont. H.T.A. R.S.D. 1970. C. 202 s. 21.
110 See Re Lamoureux and the Registrar o f M otor Vehicles, 119731 2 O.R. 28 
(Ont. C.A.).
111 Re Lamoureux and the Registrar o f Motor Vehicles, [19731 1 O.R. 573 (Ont. 
H.C. Div. Ct.).
112 Supra, note 111 at 578.
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The court concluded that the dicta in Egan had been unnecessary 
to the decision in that case. However, the same Ontario Court 
earlier in the same month was quick to use the dicta of Sir Lyman 
Duff in the Egan case to declare that legislation by Ontario in re­
spect of persons convicted as keepers of disorderly houses “pro­
vides for a civil disability arising out of the conviction.”113 The 
Court of Appeal distinguished the Ontario legislation as giving 
the landlord a right to repossess the leased premises in question 
while the Criminal Code imposed penalties on a landlord who, 
if a second offence occurred under the Code’s disorderly house 
provisions in respect of the same tenancy, failed to exercise his 
right of re-entry, whether contractual or legal."4
In similar circumstances the courts of Prince Edward Island 
have held valid a provision of that Province’s Highway Traffic Act 
which dictates mandatory suspension of the licence of a driver 
convicted under various sections of the Criminal Code. In the Bell 
case the Appeal Court felt that
In enacting the present Section 238(1) o f the Criminal Code the Parlia­
ment o f Canada in our opinion cannot be said to have enacted legislation 
which would have the effect of excluding or detracting from the legis­
lative authority of the provinces under a subject matter long recognized  
to be a matter of provincial jurisdiction.115 [citing the Egan easel.
In the Hunter case, on a charge of refusing to take a breatha­
lyzer test, the Supreme Court judge, in a trial de novo, was ada­
mant in refusing to make an order of intermittent prohibition from 
driving under the Criminal Code lest such an order have the effect 
of “circumventing valid provincial legislation”,116 which required 
automatic suspension of the convicted person’s licence.
This then was the situation prior to the reference to the Su­
preme Court of Canada of the Bell case from P.E.I. and the Ross 
case from Ontario. The P.E.I. courts were of the uniform opinion 
that the provincial automatic suspension legislation remained op­
erative despite the recent Code amendments. However, the On­
113 Re D. & G. Barclay and St. Jane Plaza Ltd., (1973) 1 O.R. 479 at 585 (Ont. 
H.C. Div. Ct.).
114 Re D. & G. Barclay Builders Ltd. and St. Jane Plaza Ltd., [1973] 3 O.R. 373 
(Ont. C.A.).
115 B elly . A.-G. o f P.E.I. (1973), 4 Nfld. & P.E.I. 27 at 37.
116 R. v. Hunter (1973), 4 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 190 (P.E.I. S.C.).
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tario lower courts were more inclined to view that the Egan case 
has been superseded by these amendments, and the Ontario Court 
of Appeal refrained from comment on the constitutional issue in 
resolving the Lamoureux case117 on the grounds that the Ontario 
Divisional Court exceeded its jurisdiction in negating the auto­
matic suspension feature of s. 21 of the Highway Traffic Act."8 
The frequency across Canada of convictions giving rise to auto­
matic suspensions gave urgency to the need to have the issues of 
the conflicting judgements settled by the Supreme Court of Can­
ada.
Before these references are examined a review of some of the 
constitutional writers is in order. The range of views of ten writers 
on the subject of paramountcy generally and the specific topic of 
this paper varies widely. The “compartmentalization”, spoken of 
earlier,"9 seems to have restricted passage of “good” legislation. 
Carr suggests that both the provinces and the federal governments 
be given concurrent jurisdiction with primary and secondary re­
sponsibilities alloted to the respective government.120 Of course 
such a solution would not entirely eliminate the problem of juris­
diction since there are bound to be questions of interpretation as 
to whether the field had been occupied by either level.
Lederman121 examines the areas of seeming conflict and sug­
gests that if the provincial legislation merely supplements or adds 
to federal legislation without contradicting it, the provincial legis­
lation may be valid. He cites the example of the Lord’s Day Al­
liance Act,122 where the federal prohibition has been withdrawn 
to permit provincial legislation in respect of Sunday observance. 
However, he accepts Cartwright J.’s proposition in the O’Grady 
case that a federal statute may by implication as well as by express 
terms, preclude concurrent legislation in the field by the province.123
Laskin feels that once we recognize the initial validity of a pro­
117 Supra, note 110.
118 Supra, note 110 at 30.
119 Supra, note 94 at 301.
120 Supra, note 94.
121 Lederman, “The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws in 
Canada" (1963), 9 McGill L.J. 185.
122 Lord's Day Alliance Act, R.S.C. 1952, C. 171, s.6(l).
123 Supra, note at 191, Also, supra note 103 for com m ents on the position of 
Cartwright J.; and infra note 154.
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vincial licencing act,
It is difficult to see how any question of occupation of the field or pre­
emption could arise by reason only o f conditioning the retention or re­
newal o f a licence on certain acts or abstentions.
He cautioned this statement with the proviso that extension 
by a province with the object of imposing a personal penalty on 
the convicted person would not be favoured by the Courts.'25 
Presumably such a penal or monetary penalty may be seen as ex­
tending the civil consequences or disabilities of an act into penal­
ties of a criminal nature.
The proliferation of provincial legislation involving acts of a 
lesser degree of mens rea than is signified in the Criminal Code 
has caused Professor Friedland to express the hope that we would 
not see a return to the distinction between felonies and misdemea­
nors “through the back door”.126 He suggests that general prin­
ciples of criminal law rather than constitutional law favour a policy 
that bars proceedings under both provincial and federal statutes 
for substantially the same offence.127
It is submitted that such a change in the law would eliminate 
any tendency for provincial authorities to continue vexatious pro­
secutions of an accused for what are, in effect, included charges. 
No one can deny the right of the provinces (or the federal govern­
ment) to enforce their legitimate laws by imposing punishments 128 
as long as the punishments meted out follow the ancient require­
ments that they be declared by an accused’s peers or by the law of 
the land,129 and that the punishments are inflicted by neither ex­
cessive fines nor cruel and unusual punishments.130 Notwithstand­
ing articles to the contrary,131 it is submitted that automatic sus­
pension is a proper exercise of provincial power to legislate for
124 Laskin, “Occupying the Field: Paramountcy in Penal Legislation” (1963),
41 C.B.R. 234 at 255.
125 Supra, note 125 at 255-6.
126 Friedland, “Double Jeopardy and the Division of Legislative Authority in Cana­
da" (1967), 17 U. of Toronto L.J. 66 at 72-3.
127 Supra, note 126 at 75-76. and at 80.
128 R. v. Wason (1889-90), 17 O .A.R. 221 (Ont. C.A.) at 238 where Burton J. in­
dicates that a power to make law implies a power also to enforce it.
129 Magna Carta (1297). 25 Edward I. C.29. We are reminded by Gale J. in Re 
Toronto Newspaper Guild & Globe Printing Co., (1951) O.R. 435 at 473 
that Magna Carta is still law in Canada. However, the effects of the Magna 
Carta can be amended, viz: R. v. Ganaplathi (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 495 
(B.C.S.C.).
130 Bill of Rights (1688), 1 Will & Mary sess. 2 C. 2, s .l .
131 Nosanchuk, “T o Drive or Not to Drive?” The Oyez Vol. 4, No. 4 Feb. 1973 
at 9.
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safety on the highways. It may seem to be a harsh example of a 
statute derogating from the common law principle of audi alteram 
partem , by not permitting a hearing before the suspension be­
comes effective.132
Any implication that an intermittent prohibition to drive im­
plies permission to drive the remainder of the time, appears to 
this writer to be an invasion, under the guise of the criminal law, 
of an exclusive provincial licencing prerogative to determine the 
conditions under which a person is to be permitted to hold a valid 
licence.
That the provinces have undisputed authority to issue licences or per­
mits for the right to drive motor vehicles on their highways and that 
this authority carries with it the authority to suspend or cancel them  
upon the happening of certain conditions are undoubted principles —
Egan C ase.1
And it should not matter that these conditions result in a lon­
ger or harsher suspension than any driving prohibition.134 The 
fact that the driving prohibitions may now be intermittent should 
not make any difference.
From the point of view of the federal government, it cannot 
be questioned that the Criminal Code can prescribe punishments 
involving driving prohibitions and can “affect” provincial suspen­
sions of drivers’ licences.135 It is apparent that Parliament in its 
1972 amendments to s. 238 (1) and 238 (3.1) of the Criminal Code 
did so with the intention of taking over areas “which so far are only 
covered by provincial enactments.”136 Even though provincial 
governments would prefer to have the federal government vacate 
the field of driving prohibitions, and leave it to them to deal with 
in the form tailored to the situation in each province,137 Ottawa 
officials seem to be of the opinion that Parliament alone should
\
132 See infra Part III for a fuller discussion of this point.
133 Supra, note 102 at 616 — the Sask. Breath Specimen case, along with similar 
principles in: the Egan case, supra note 19; Fairbairn v. Highway Traffic Board 
o f Sask. (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 709 (Q.B.D.) and Zahara v. Minister o f High­
ways for Alta. (1965), 51 W.W.R. 289 (S.C.).
134 Supra, note 19.
135 One should not go as far as Trueman J. in the Ottenson case to the effect that 
suspensions “cannot be affected by the Code."
Supra, note 44.
136 Supra, note 58 at 376.
137 See Minutes o f the Proceedings o f the 54th Annual Meeting o f The Con ference 
o f Commissioners on Uniformity o f Legislation in Canada (1972), at 52-3.
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determine in what Criminal Code circumstances and for how long 
a convicted driver should be kept off the roads across Canada.138
Such an impasse, if not resolved by the courts, will require a 
political solution which, presumably, the federal government would 
be willing to make only if a greater measure of uniformity in the 
provincial legislation were achieved.
Any affirmation at the present time that both the federal pro­
hibition from driving, intermittent or total, and the provincial 
automatic suspension or revocation of licence, as the result of a 
Criminal Code conviction, are to be considered intra vires leaves 
open to question the effect of s. 238 (3.1) of the Criminal Code.139 
It has been said that this section only withdraws the criminal con­
sequences of a provincial licence suspension that is inconsistent 
with an order prohibiting driving.140 However, the Criminal Code 
makes no distinction as to what may have caused the suspension 
of a person’s right to drive, whether it was a civil or criminal dis­
ability or penalty. Any attempt by the provinces to evade the ef­
fect of s. 238 (3.1) so as to define civil consequences of driving 
while suspended will have to overcome the difficulties apparent 
in the Munro and Dickie141 cases. There the courts said that what 
is now s. 238 (3) of the Criminal Code has occupied the field, and 
they declared provincial law inoperative with respect to driving 
while suspended. Whether a court will be able to distinguish these 
decisions to allow the provinces to legislate in the area of “civil” 
consequences of disabilities of driving while suspended remains 
to be seen. It is now appropriate to examine the Bell142 and Ross143 
cases.
138 See Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Jus­
tice and Legal Affairs. May 11, 1972, (Q ueen’s Printer, Ottawa), at 7:11 to 
7:18.
139 Supra, note 49.
140 Supra, note 138.
141 Supra, note 104.
142 Bell v. A.-G. forP.E.I. (u.ireported) S.C.C.; references here are to the advance 
report o f the case as received from the Supreme Court o f Canada.
143 Ross v. The Registrar o f M otor Vehicles (unreported) S.C.C. references to 
the Ross case are with respect to the advance report o f the case as received  
from the Supreme Court of Canada.
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D. THE DECISION ON THE RECENT REFERENCES TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
In the Bell case the appellant had been convicted of a “breath­
alyzer” offence under s. 236 of the Criminal Code. No order pro­
hibiting him from driving was added to the $100 fine that was im­
posed, but he was notified by provincial authorities that his licence 
was suspended144 automatically for 6 months by operation of 
s. 247(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.145 As mentioned earlier,146 
the P.E.I. Supreme Court en banco denied his contention that 
the H.T.A. section is ultra vires. The Bell case was heard together 
with the Ross case by the Supreme Court of Canada. The reasons 
for judgment of the majority in the Ross case also apply to the 
Bell147 case, even though the lower court in the Ross case did make 
on order of prohibition from driving whereas the magistrate in the 
Bell case refrained from doing so.148 This was the distinction of 
the two cases for the dissenting judges in the Supreme Court of 
Canada; they agreed in the disposition of the Bell case149 but not 
in the Ross case.
Spence J. thought that an intermittent prohibition for cer­
tain times had the effect of permitting driving at other times.150 
However, he correctly points out that the sentence passed by the 
lower court “did not prohibit driving at those other times for em­
ployment purposes.”151
Pigeon J., for the majority, says that there is no repugnancy 
since the “Code merely provides for the making of prohibitory 
orders limited as to time and place,”152 and it does not matter that 
he may get in reality no benefit from any indulgence granted under 
the Code.153 Referring to the O ’Grady v. Sparling case, he con­
sidered that only the dissenting judges found necessary implica-
144 Supra, note 142 per Pigion J. at 2.
145 S.P.E.I. 1964 C. 14. as am. by 1970 C. 26. S. 10.
146 Supra, test at note 115.
147 Supra, note 144 at 2 & 3.
148 Supra, note 143 per Judson J. at 5.
149 Supra, note 143 per Judson J. at 5. and per Spence J. at 1 and 5.
150 Supra, note 143 at 2.
151 Ibid.
152 Supra, note 144 at 7.
153 Ibid.
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tions of what kinds or degrees of conduct was not to be punished, 
and continued:
In other words, the majority decided that Parliament did not implicitly 
permit conduct which did not com e within the description of the Crim­
inal Code o ffen ce ,154
Taking this to the context of the case he said:
Parliament did not by the amendments to S. 238 of the Criminal Code 
purport to deal generally with the right to drive a motor vehicle after a 
conviction for certain o ffences.'55
He was of the opinion that the order of the lower court with re­
spect to the provincial automatic suspension provisions was made 
without jurisdiction.156
Without indicating how the provinces will be able to impose 
fines on persons who drive within the constraints of a prohibition 
order under the Code but in violation of a provincial statute, he 
says that s. 238 (3.1) of the Code
goes no further than to provide that in such case, the penalty provided 
under the Criminal Code for driving while under suspension shall not 
apply.157
It would appear then that provincial legislation carefully worded 
to be confined to the “civil” consequences of driving while sus­
pended would be in order.'58
In effect the Supreme Court of Canada has reaffirmed the 
judgement of Duff C.J. in the Egan case on the validity of the pro­
vincial and federal statutes with respect to licence suspensions and 
driving prohibitions.159 There is no indication of what the decision 
might be if Parliament were to decide to deal with the right to drive 
after a conviction rather than just a prohibition from driving. This 
writer believes that such an attempt by the federal government 
would be labelled as a colourable device — an encroachment on 
a local provincial matter, and ultra vires of Parliament’s powers.160
154 Supra, note 144 at 9.
155 Ibid.
156 Supra, note 144 at 10.
157 Supra, note 144 at 7.
158 See text supra, at note 141.
159 Supra, note 144 at 3 and 4.
160 See text supra, at note 57, 58 and 59.
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Our attention now turns to an examination of the principles 
of natural justice in this context, a survey of the current pro­
vincial legislation relating to automatic suspensions, and sug­
gestions for elimination of the double jeopardy aspect of natural 
justice.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM IN THE PROVINCIAL 
STATUTES CONCERNING AUTOMATIC SUSPENSIONS
A. SHOULD THE SUSPENSIONS BE AUTOMATIC?
The questions to be answered here are: Should the licence 
suspension, revocation, cancellation or whatever remain auto­
matic on the happening of certain events? Do not the principles 
of natural justice tend to develop an attitude or moral suasion 
towards the idea that rights and privileges once granted should 
not be subject to automatic suspension or cancellation without 
the opportunity of the aggrieved person being heard prior to such 
action? One can easily dismiss such a question as being so much 
poppycock and of little value when it is seen by the judgements 
of the Privy Council that in the areas of exclusive provincial con­
cern the provinces are sovereign and supreme.161 It can be as­
sumed that such a provincial power carries with it the right to de­
termine civil rights and privileges by statute on the happening of 
an event rather than to require a hearing to be held. The reluc­
tance to grant pre-suspension hearings may be predicted on the 
idea that it is a great deal easier to refuse to grant a privilege than 
it is to set up legislation and administrative machinery to take away 
an already existing one:
You prove to me why you need this privilege; I don’t want to have to 
give you sufficient reasons for taking it from you!
The above may be too simplistic but it does convey the nature of 
the reluctance.
The courts have made no substantial enquiry into the pre­
rogatives of the provinces to legislate on automatic, or even dis­
cretionary suspensions which at the same time withdraw any rights 
the person may have had to a hearing. Most accept this without 
comment unless there has been an unusual use of the discretionary 
power. A County Court Judge in British Columbia has referred to 
unchallengeable discretion of the British Columbia Superintend-
161 Hodge v. The Queen ( 1883-4). 9 App. Cas 115 (P.C.MOnt.) at 132. and Bedard 
v. Dawson. (19231 S.C.R. 681 (Que.).
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ent of Motor Vehicles to suspend summarily without the necessity 
of a hearing as a breach of the basic principle that one should have 
the right to face his accuser and answer any charge.162 Where, 
however, the discretion to suspend a driver’s licence is permitted 
and the statute does not negate the requirement of a hearing, it 
has been accepted in the Fairbairn case that the person involved 
must be given a chance to give his side of the case as to mitigating 
factors.163
The principle of audi alteram partem has been accepted in 
the Common Law for some time. It can be seen in the phrase:
that no man is to be deprived of his property without having an oppor­
tunity of being heard
and this extends both to judicial and administrative tribunals in 
the exercise of their judicial discretion.164
That rule is o f universal application and founded upon the plainest prin­
ciples o f Justice.163
It extends to cases where the civil rights of persons are affected.166 
In ascertaining the law and the facts of a case where there is no 
express statutory provision to the contrary167 a board
must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty 
lying upon every one who decides anything.168
Lord Loreburn noted that the mechanics of such a hearing need 
not be too rigid or standardized as long as it is done with a view to
giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for 
correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudiced to their 
view .189
It is within such a spirit that a convicted driver can point to various 
factors which may militate against the imposition of a suspension 
in his particular case. Suggestions on how the provinces should 
alter their legislation will follow a review of provincial legislation 
on the subject of automatic suspensions.
162 R. v. Peebles (1963), 42 W.W.R. 161 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
163 Fairbairn v. Highway Traffic Board o f Sask. (1958). D.L.R. (2d) 709 (Q .B.D.).
164 Cooper v. Wandsworth Bd o f Works, 143 E.R. 414 at 418 per Erie C.J.
165 Supra, note 164 per Willes J.
166 R. v. Tribunal o f Appeal under the Housing Act, (1920) 3 K.B. 334 as expanded  
by M cNiven J.A. in Lee Wing v. Peter Don Chang, (1954) 4 D.L.R. 821 Sask. 
C.A. at 825-6.
167 See Lee Wing v. Peter Don Chang, (1954 ] 4 D.L.R. 821 (Sask. C A.).
168 Local Government Board v. Arlidge,\ 1915] A.C. 120 (H.L.) at 132-3 and Ran- 
dolf  v. The Queen, [1966] Ex. C.K. 157 at 164; Board o f Education v. Rice, 
[1911] A.C. 179 (H.L.) at 182, per Lord Loreburn.
169 Supra, note 168.
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B. THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLA TION
A cursory survey170 indicates that nine provinces have pro­
visions for automatic suspension, cancellation, or revocation of 
a driver’s licence following conviction under numerous sections 
of the Criminal Code. Only Quebec does not have provision for 
such automatic suspension. Even in Quebec, however, s. 91 of the 
Highway Code171 allows the province to suspend the licence of a 
driver “convicted” in a civil, penal or criminal suit, where the 
driver was impaired, or intoxicated, drove dangerously or did not 
stop at the scene of an accident.172
The automatic suspension of a driver’s licence varies in in­
tensity of the number of sections of the Criminal Code which 
give effect to it, from three sections, in British Columbia173 to 
any section in which the Criminal Code offence involves the use 
of a motor vehicle, in New Brunswick.174 The period of the sus­
pension varies from one month175 to one year for a first conviction, 
and to five years for a third conviction.176 It will also increase if 
the person, who has been convicted, has been involved, at the 
same time, in an accident causing property damage or bodily 
injury.177 Presumably a person so convicted will be fervently hop­
ing that a human or computer error will overlook such things as a 
second conviction or property damage having occurred. The 
provinces tend to impose stiffer suspension for convictions arising 
out of the use of a motor vehicle under the Criminal Code s.203 
(Criminal Negligence causing death), s. 204 (Criminal Negligence 
causing bodily harm), s. 219 (manslaughter) and s. 233 (1) (dan­
gerous driving).
170 Except where noted the provincial legislation is that in effect to December 
3 ! , 1972.
171 Highway Code R.S.Q. 1964 C.231. S.91 as am. by Transport A ct S.Q- 1972 
C.55, S.94.
172 Although no direct reference is made to the Criminal Code in the Quebec 
Highway Code, as amended, the situations referred to are found in Sections 
234, 223(4) and 233(2) of the Criminal Code.
173 M.V.A. R.S.B.C. 1960 S.253. S86D, as am. by 1972 S.B.C. C.35, S.24.
174 M.V.A. S.N.B. 1955 C.13, S.271 as am. by S.N.B. 1970 C34, S.19.
175 M.V.A. B.C., S.86D.
176 For a third conviction within 5 years Sask. Vehicles A ct R.S.S. 1965 C.377 
S.87 as am. S.S. 1970 C.79. and S.S. 1972 C.144.
177 Ont. H.T.A. R.S.O. 1970 C.202, Ss. 20 & 21, and Man. H .T.A. R.S.M . 1970 
C.H.-60. S.238.
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Some provinces allow for some judicial discretion; P.E.I. 
gives the courts the discretion to suspend drivers’ licences up to 
five years for certain Criminal Code convictions.178
In Alberta the convicting court may reduce the period of 
disqualification or suspension to not less than three months, where 
the conviction involves breathalyzer-related, and impairment 
sections.179
The Act in Nova Scotia permits the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles to suspend a driver’s licence until a hearing is held, with 
the driver present to present his case, at which time he may con­
firm or vary the suspension for a further period or revoke the 
licence. This type of suspension does not require formal notice 
of a conviction from the court. This writer can only surmise that 
a suspension might be handled with the same discretion as a charge 
under the Criminal Code where the prosecutor has a choice as 
to whether to proceed by indictment or summary conviction. 
It is not clear whether the discretionary suspension by the Regis­
trar takes precedence over the automatic suspension if the time 
limit for the latter is greater.180
Only four provinces have any procedure by which a driver 
may seek to have his automatic suspension varied or dispensed. 
In Saskatchewan this involves petitioning the Lieutenant-Gover- 
nor-in-Council.181 In Newfoundland a licence may be restored 
if any order of prohibition from driving under the Criminal Code 
s.238(l) has been cancelled, or the driver may apply at any time 
to a District Court Judge who may direct the Registrar to restore 
a driving licence unconditionally or for such times and places 
as may be specified in the latter court order.182 Only in Manitoba183
178 Code Ss. 203. 204, 233-. 234. 235(2), 236. 238, 239, 295 per H.T.A. S.P.E.I. 
1964 S. 14. S.248. as am. by S.P.E.I. 1970.
179 Alta H.T.A. R.S.A. 1970 C.169, S.206, as am. by S.A. 1972 C.89, S.8.
180 M.V.A. R.S.N.S. 1967 S.191, Ss. 250 and 60 as am. by S.N.S. 1972 C.45, S.12 
and 5A respectively.
181 Sask V.A. S. 103. as am. by Ss. 1967 C.82.
182 Nfld. H.T.A. S.N. 1962 C.82. S.67 as am. by S.N. 1966-67 C.68 S.10; S.N. 1970 
C.25, S.5; S.N. 1972 C.45, S.2. The restoration of a licence by a D.C.J. is sub­
ject to any order or prohibition from driving under S.238(l) of the Code.
183 H.T.A. R.S.M. 1970 C.H-60, Ss.252. 253 as am. by
S.M. 1970 C. 70. Ss. 78, 79. 80, 81, 82 
S.M. 1971 C.71, Ss. 126,127,128,219 
S.M. 1972 C. 79, Ss. 57, 58.
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and in New Brunswick184 are there administrative boards which 
are permitted to vary, rescind or confirm automatic suspensions 
as the result of Criminal Code convictions. In both jurisdictions 
there is a Licence Suspension Appeal Board which, on hearing 
the party, may rescind or vary the suspension on such conditions, 
terms and restrictions as it deems required, provided that it is 
satisfied that exceptional hardship would result if the suspension 
were to remain in effect, and that such a step is not contrary to 
the public interest.
With a couple of exceptions, decisions of the L.S.A.B. are 
reviewable by a county court judge if application is made to him 
within thirty days. In Manitoba185 such review is by trial de novo, 
while in New Brunswick186 the judge is limited to the evidence 
and proceedings before the Board.
It is interesting to note that New Brunswick in its 1973 Spring 
Session has amended the Motor Vehicle Act by enacting S.268A187 
which has the effect of not compelling the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles to suspend a licence where it would be inconsistent 
with an order made under s.238(3) of the Criminal Code. However, 
this particular section has not yet been proclaimed.
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE PROVINCIAL
LEGISLA TION & CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis of the provincial legislation in 
the area of automatic suspension it can be seen that conformity 
among the provinces is at best sporadic. Perhaps this is not all 
bad for, viewed from a local perspective, there may be different 
hazards and different degrees of incidence from province to 
province which require lesser or more stringent action by the legis­
lature. It is submitted that the provincial legislatures are closest 
to and most concerned with local traffic safety and conditions. 
They should be the ones who determine what conditions and 
what circumstances will result in loss of driving privileges. It is 
up to them to determine when a person may be allowed to drive; 
it should be up to the provinces to determine when that permission 
should be withdrawn.
184 M. V.A. S.N.B. 1955 C.13, Ss. 281A, 281B. 281C. 283 and 284. as en. by S.N.B. 
1967 C.54. S.25 & 26. and as amended by S.N.B. 1972 C.48, S.59 & 60 and 
S.N.B. 1973 C .59, S.16 & 17.
185 Man. H.T.A. S.253(10).
186 N.B. M. V.A. S.283.
187 S.N.B. 1973. C.59, S.14.
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Accordingly, Parliament should vacate the field in deference 
to the provinces. It is not suggested that the present federal legis­
lation of prohibitions is ultra vires. Rather the suggestion is made 
in the interests of administrative efficacy.
Release of this area of the criminal law in deference to pro­
vincial “civil” legislation should be made only as a trade-off for 
greater uniformity on the part of the provincial legislatures, while, 
nevertheless, permitting individual provinces to retain some de­
gree of flexibility in their legislation. One point that should be 
examined by all provinces is the return to some form of natural 
justice188 in their licence suspension procedure so as to eliminate 
the finality of an automatic procedure.
Whether a pre-suspension hearing would be made by a board 
or by a court may be of some consequence to the person involved. 
One could surmise that a board, unencumbered by all the trappings 
of a court, would tend to more informal. On the other hand, the 
courts may be bound to follow precedent in given situations, 
and they would tend to overlook individual mitigating factors. 
Of course the discretion given to any board of this nature would 
be subject to review by the courts.189 With the position of over­
seer, the courts would tend to keep a board from acting arbitrar­
ily and without cause, while maintaining a degree of flexibility 
that a particular situation may require.
There are drawbacks in setting up such a system whether 
that system be a judicial, administrative or executive function 
which makes “decisions as to individual rights arrived at by ascer­
taining facts and applying some rule or principle of law to them”.190 
Not only should there be a requirement of notice and a hearing of 
both sides, but also, one should be made aware of what penalties 
may arise out of the hearing.191
It is submitted that such a change in procedure would be 
feasible in any event. A prerequisite still could be that the onus 
would be on the driver to show cause why his licence should not 
be suspended, revoked or cancelled. Politically, it would be up 
to the provincial or federal governments to balance their indi­
188 See Supra, Part III Section A.
189 A trial de novo on the Manitoba scale is suggested (see supra Note 185) rather 
than a simple review of the Board’s action as in N.B. See supra note 186.
190 Randolph v. The Queen, [1966] Ex. C.R. 157 at 164.
191 R ■ v. Ontario Racing Commission, ex parte Taylor, (1970)0 .R. 509 (H.C.) 
at 516.
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vidual interests by giving the agency concerned, full discretionary 
power of keeping people off the roads, conditionally or uncondi­
tionally. And, unless it were to operate so that a convicted person 
in any province could get conditional permission to drive for 
employment, or other worthwhile purposes, there would be little 
value in changing the present system.
